Citations

1. ba’ ra ba rgyal mtshan dpal bzang /. thar bar 'jug pa'i gru bo zab don chos kyi gter mdzod las grub mtha'i rnam bzhag gi dka’ 'grel/. Vol. 2. Dehradun: Ngawang Gyaltsen and Ngawang Lungtok, 1970, 2: 41.4.

   Note:

   In this section, 'Ba' ra ba presents the various non-Buddhist and Buddhist [41 f] philosophical systems. The following is an outline of his presentation of the Buddhist systems (see under gsang sngags kyi theg pa for Mantrayāna traditions):

   Those based on one sided perspective:

   1. Vaibhāṣikas 27.1

   2. Sautrāntikas 41.4

   3. Pratyekabuddhas 75.4

   4. Cittamātra 81.5

   Those based on a non mistaken perspective:

   1. Madhyamaka 107.4

   a. mdo sde'i spyod pa'i dbu ma

   b. rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma

   c. snang ba spyod pa'i dbu ma

   2. Mantrayāna (see reference) 166.5 on superiority of Mantrayāna

2. rong zom chos kyi bzang po/. lta ba dang grub mtha' sna tshogs pa brjed byang du bgyis pa/ In Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpendzod, vol. 73. Leh: S.W. Tashigangpa, 1974, 335.

   Note:

   [334.1] Śrāvakas bye brag pa (Vaibhāṣikas) and mdo sde pa (Sautrāntika)

   both alike in asserting the concrete existence of objects

   composed of very subtle atoms

   A. Vaibhāṣikas are similar to the Mu stegs pa Bye brag who (also) assert existence.

   [335.5] B. Sautrāntikas so called because they concur with the vast

   diversity of the Buddha word

   [339.3] Vijñaptimātravādins (rnam par shes pa tsam du smra ba)

   Cittamātrins claim that mind exists in an ultimate sense. They must eliminate the Śrāvaka like positive imputation that things exist objectively since they are non existent and the great Madhyamaka like negative imputation that Mind also does not exist in an ultimate sense.

   [341.3] Madhyamaka '1) Yogācāra Madhyamaka similar to Cittamatrins with regard to the conventional: since the whole of reality, what presences and how it is interpreted, comes to presence due to the power of mind in its going astray, they claim that nothing exists on the objective side. They dispel the limitation of a Śrāvaka like positive imputation of existence since nothing is found to exist objectively and limitation of the great Madhyamaka like negative imputation that says Mind also is utterly non existent.

   [343.4] 2) Sautrāntika Madhyamaka since they concur with the vast

   diversity of the Buddha word (characteristic of) the Śrāvaka Sautrāntika, they concur with the tradition of those for whom the conventional is merely (like) a magic play (analogy of magician who transforms pebbles, wood etc. into horses, elephants by using spells) (see also theg 'jug)

3. ‘jigs med gling pa/. yon tan rin po che’i mdzod kyi rgya cher ‘grel pa bden gnyis shing rta/ In Ngargyur Nyingmay Sungrab, v. 29-37. Vol. 1. Gangtok, Sikkim: Sonam T. Kazi, 1970, 1: 835.3.

   Note:

   In this passage, 'Jigs med gling pa defines and summarizes each of the traditional Buddhist philosophical systems with respect to their conceptions of the two aspects of reality (see under bden gnyis). On 855.3, 'Jigs med gling pa quotes a lengthy (over ten folia) passage from a text ascribed to Śāntapuri which offers an interesting summary of valid Indian and Tibetan Buddhist traditions in relation to the three turnings and with reference to authoritative scriptures.